University of California administrators received their assignment from the Board of Regents last July: End preferential policies in admissions by Jan. 1, 1997. Shortly thereafter, the Board of Regents chose a new president, Richard Atkinson, and his pledge to carry out this particular assignment was definitely part of the deal. Atkinson may not have been enthusiastic about the new policy, but he seemed, at least, less unwilling to obey than the other candidates for the top job, who were openly in rebellion. Half a year passed, and on Jan. 18 the regents declined to rescind their July vote. What's been happening in the meantime? Not much, apparently, because last week Atkinson announced he was delaying implementation of the no-preference policy for a year. There wasn't time, he said, for the UC system to make the change. "There simply are too many issues and too little time to finish the job in time for the 1997 admission cycle," Atkinson said. But administrators could have started planning six months ago. The students who will enter UC schools as freshmen in September 1997 had not yet started their junior year then. This spring, they will begin collecting catalogs and applications. They'll submit their applications this November and admissions decisions will be made in the spring of 1997 — after the date set by the regents. There would have been sufficient time. The problem is that the people who were supposed to do this really didn't want to, and they put it off hoping the regents would change their minds. But the regents didn't budge, and aren't likely to. Gov. Pete Wilson's high-profile involvement with the issue of preferences no doubt affected the timing of the regents' vote in July, but not its composition — 14 to 10 in favor of ending preferences in admissions, 15 to 10 in favor of ending them in hiring and contracting. Student protests make for dramatic television footage and are widely covered, but they have in fact been small. The student newspaper at UC-Berkeley even endorsed the regents' new policy, although only after a bitter debate on the editorial board. And as the regents now know, the faculty, although divided, is more in favor of the board's change in policy than it is opposed. A poll of faculty members conducted by the Roper Center for the California Association of Scholars showed that overall, only 31 percent of faculty supported a preference policy, and 48 percent supported an equal-opportunity policy that did not rely on preferences. There was a definite gender gap, with 42 percent of female faculty endorsing preferences compared with only 28 percent of male faculty. But that says as much about women's motives as it does about men's. The Roper poll was a scientific telephone survey of 1,000 members of the academic senates, with an exceptionally high response rate of 80 percent, and a sampling error of 3.5 percent. The CAS has long been opposed preferential policies, but it didn't design the questions to elicit a desired response. Martin Trow, professor in the Graduate School of Public Policy at Berkeley, presented the poll results at the regents' meeting. He has been the chairman of UC's Academic Council and a faculty representative to the board, and has years of experience in the Machiavellian politics of higher education. In his testimony, Trow explained why the perception of faculty attitudes is so different from the private reality. Faculty Senates on all nine campuses have passed resolutions condemning the regents' July vote. "The University recruits scholars and teachers," Trow said, "not fearless Green Berets. "From the president's office on down, every campus, every college has an administrative office and Senate committees to plan and enforce preferential policies; every department has an 'affirmative action' officer to monitor its behavior." In this climate, it's not surprising that faculty members who disagree keep their views to themselves, and they don't seek or obtain administrative posts. "All the chancellors," Trow said, "supported the policies of group preferences, as also the provosts and deans on every campus, who didn't become provosts and deans unless they did." Yes, faculty members have tenure, but there are lots of ways to make professors' lives miserable short of firing them outright. Everything from office space and secretarial help to teaching schedules and committee assignments is at the disposal of department chairmen and senior administrators. And Atkinson, it seems, was following his administration's lead in opposing the regents. That is really very peculiar. It's hard to imagine a newly appointed CEO outside in the real world deciding to defy the company's board of directors on a central issue. And indeed, the chairman of the board (the governor of California) called Atkinson to Sacramento to deliver an explanation. Afterwards, Atkinson backed down a little; he'd follow orders on graduate-school admissions, he said, but undergraduates would have to wait until 1998. That wasn't far enough back, and with a closed-door meeting of the regents scheduled for Wednesday, he now says he erred in not adequately consulting the regents before deciding to postpone. The regents should not accept either defiance or the excuse of not enough time. Both public opinion and the state of constitutional law are turning against the overtly discriminatory policies that UC has been enforcing for decades. And Atkinson, who is after all a professor, should remember that starting your assignments late is not grounds for an extension of the due date. Subj: Re: Affirmative Action and UC regents (fwd) Date: 96-01-26 12:48:31 EST From: linsee@well.com (Linda Seebach) To: valleytms@aol.com ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 26 Jan 1996 00:00:36 -0800 From: Martin Trow To: Linda Seebach Subject: Re: Affirmative Action and UC regents Linda: May I share my hunches with you without being quoted? For what its worth, I cannot recall a situation in which the President of UC so directly and flagrantly disobeyed a clear directive from the Regents. It is quite unconstitutional, and at the very least wholly forfeits the trust of the Regents majority which voted for the new policy. It could be seen as a kind of adminstrative coup, or declaration of war by the President against the Regents. But for Atkinson as the leader of the administrative party (which I have begun to call the "nomenclatura"), the move was very shrewd. I believe,without direct evidence, that Atkinson would not at all mind being fired for this act. He would leave the University in a blaze of glory, defending its autonomy against Regential interference into the heart of administrative discretion, and would soon be awarded the Clark Kerr Medal -- all a highly attractive alternative to years of harassment by Regents,students and Chancellors, ground between the upper and nether millstones of passion and conviction. Moreover, there is no successor in sight; all the Chancellors are disqualified by insubordination, and who of any distinction from outside would take this job now? Moreover, firing Atkinson would set off an unholy uproar inside the University and on all the editorial pages of the state. So Atkinson can't lose. Indeed, I think he will win this one, and will not be made a martyr by the Regents, but at the price of continued mistrust and harassment by Regents and Sacramento. Before this week I thought Atkinson wanted to settle this issue, leave it for the initiative (where the Regents left it last week), and get on to other problems. This action, along with sending the most vocally anti-Regents Chancellor (ie., Chuck Young) to "negotiate" with the investigatory AAUP committee, suggests to me that Atkinson is actively committed to the defeat of the Regents and their policy. A very risky game. The AAUP committee, as you may know,is a hanging jury. I know some of its members, who are and have long been strongly committed to the preferences policy. Atwell, until recently President of ACE, was a strong advocate of the activist affirmative action policies of Middle States, the regional accrediting body that Lamar Alexander had to curb when he was Secy of Education a few years ago. That committee was brought into being at the request of Karabel's group of faculty activists to put outside pressure on the Regents; sending Chuck Young to work with them tips Atkinson's hand; in my view, he is now one with them. This at least is my reading of the current situation; it involves a sharp turn in my views since last Thursday. But I may be as wrong today as I was then. I will be interested in your take on events, and look forward to seeing anything you write on the subject. Regards, Martin Trow Martin Trow Professor Graduate School of Public Policy U.C. Berkeley CA. 94720, USA e mail: Trow@violet.Berkeley.edu fax: 510 643 9657 Dear Linda: Thanks for your note. I was busy writing the attached for presentation to the Regents today, It was very well recrived; almost the only dissenting viewe in a morning full of repetitive attaks on the Regents decision of last July, but you would not hear a word on it in coverage. But that is to be expected; the media has also managed to ignore the survey of UC faculty which produces just the findings that Atkinson anticipated and everyone feared. I attach my talk to the Regents, and the place to call for the press release on the poll. Can I be of any help? Martin Trow Presentation to the Board of Regents of the University of California, 1/18/96 Martin Trow Graduate School of Public Policy University of California, Berkeley Introduction: I am Martin Trow, Professor in the Graduate School of Public Policy at Berkeley. Some of you know me: a few years ago I sat with you as Chairman of the Academic Council, and Faculty Representative to this Board. I have also served on most of the Senate committees and as Chair of the Berkeley Division. So I have some experience of university governance, and some appreciation of the problems faced by the Regents, the President's Office and the Academic Senate as together they try to govern the University of California. I also have for many years been a trustee of Carleton College in Minnesota, and have some experience of university life and governance as a longtime student of higher education in this country and overseas. If I say that I did not come to abuse you or threaten you, I hope you will not be disappointed. I have come to try to shed some light on the way the university is governed, how we have to come to be where we are, and how we might move on from here. The Roper Survey Let me begin by saying that on the issue of affirmative action no one can speak for the faculty of this University, not myself, and not even, or perhaps especially not, those who claim to do so with the greatest passion. And that is because attitudes and sentiment among the faculty are divided very sharply, and almost down the middle, on the substantive issues that your policy of 9 July last spoke to. Here I do not have to call on my impressions or anecdotes. Just a few weeks ago in December the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, based at the University of Connecticut and directed by a distinguished political scientist, conducted a telephone survey of 1,000 members of the Academic Senate of this university. They were distributed on all nine campuses of the university, selected at random, and included the whole range of members from Instructors through full Professors, and sampled in proportion to the relative size of the campuses. The response rate to the survey was 80 percent, thanks to the persistence of Roper in calling back; that, as you may know, is a very high response rate for any kind of survey. The response rate also may have been high because the survey asked only four questions, all focused around aspects of affirmative action. The survey was sponsored by the California Association of Scholars, an organization of faculty members, administrators, trustees, and advanced graduate students at private and public colleges throughout California. But the design of the questions were shaped and approved by Roper, and they were in charge of the actual survey itself. They have since reported the bare bones of the findings in a press release this past Monday. Very briefly, voting members of the Academic Senate were asked whether they favored granting preferences to women and certain racial and ethnic groups, or whether they favored promoting equal opportunities in these areas without regard to an individual's race, sex, or ethnicity. A wide plurality (48 percent) favored the latter policy; only 31 percent favored the granting of race and ethnic preferences. These findings are consistent with polls on this issue over the past twenty years, both among academics and in the general population. When the question was put differently, in the form "Do you favor or oppose using race, religion, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin as a criterion for admission to the University of California," the findings show a bare majority (52%) for retaining those as "criteria." On the issue of retaining these criteria for appointments and contracts, the support falls to 47%. Both these questions reflect the language of the resolutions passed by the Regents in July of 1995, and the results reflect the subsequent controversy within the University over the timing and degree of consultation with the faculty before the policy was changed. But when asked in yet another question about their own understanding of the term "affirmative action," given the choice between "granting preferences to women and certain racial and ethnic groups," or "promoting equal opportunities for all individuals without regard to their race, sex, or ethnicity," the faculty sample showed a preference for the second definition over the first, by 43% to 37%. Another 15% accept neither statement as their own meaning of the term. Indeed, one might note that over the years the University highjacked the term "affirmative action" to refer to its policies of group preference, contrary to the views of so many of our academic colleagues who still think it means "promoting equal opportunities." We ought to try to take it back; it was a good idea and still is. Incidentally, there are sharp divisions on this issue not only within our faculty but also among students. The national survey of American undergraduates conducted annually by UCLA's Higher Education Research Institute has just reported results. The report notes that "When presented with the statement "Affirmative action in college admissions should be abolished, a full 50% agreed." (San Francisco Chronicle, January 8, 1996, p. A3). Attitudes regarding the use of race, ethnicity and gender in admissions and appointments divide the members of the University. But it does not take a survey for me to say with confidence that there is a broad consensus regarding the importance of broad access to the University, and the desirability of a wide diversity among the faculty and students. If attitudes regarding racial and ethnic preferences divide us, attitudes regarding diversity bring us together. And that suggests the direction of our future policies and programs. Those policies must include plans for the University to involve itself more deeply in primary and secondary education, and find ways to improve education all through society so that weak preparation does not preclude potentially able students of all backgrounds from coming to our campuses. Berkeley's Pledge is an important first step in that direction, pointing the way in which the University can come together around policies which will benefit not only the university, not only disadvantaged students, but the society at large. And that is certainly part of our broad mission as a public university. The "faculty" and the "Academic Senate" But the question may arise in your minds, as it has in mine, of how it is that meetings of campus Senates on all nine campuses can have passed resolutions condemning the Regent's actions of last July, while the survey just described shows the faculty pretty evenly divided on the issues. There are several reasons. For one thing, the University recruits scholars and teachers, not fearless Green Berets. The University over the years has developed a strong climate and organizational structure in support of its policy of racial and ethnic preferences: from the President's Office down, every campus, every college has administrative offices and Senate committees to plan and enforce preferential policies; every department has an "affirmative action" officer to monitor its behavior. All the Chancellors, with I suspect varying degrees of enthusiasm, supported the policies of group preference, as also the Provosts and Deans on every campus, who didn't become Provosts and Deans unless they did. But there was and is no equivalent organization of people and energy devoted to criticizing the old policies, or trying to reform them. Even professors with tenure do not like to run afoul of their Deans and Provosts, much less their Chancellors, all of whom can on occasion be very clear about their preferences, though not always on paper. In all candor, I must confess that if I were still Director of Berkeley's Center for Studies in Higher Education I might not be speaking to you this way. I wonder if these senior administrators have any idea of the chilling effect on dissent of their strong commitments on these issues which divide us, commitments which as we see give voice to only one side. In addition, and apart from the weight of this "affirmative action" community and its real power in the University, there is always the danger for critics of those arrangements of calling down on themselves the charge of "racist." No matter how unwarranted and unfair, it is an awful epithet, and can affect one's relations with one's colleagues and students — indeed, one's whole life and career. Intimidation is perhaps too strong a word, but it is not far off. Can you be surprised if most faculty members who did not share the official doctrines on admissions and appointments might have preferred to keep their views to themselves, at least until they had the protection of anonymity in a survey being conducted from Connecticut? Let's look for a moment at these resolutions passed at meetings of the campus Senates. They are all votes of those attending, and we know that such meetings are ordinarily not well attended, and those who come are disproportionately those who have very strong interests in the outcome. In this case, for reasons already suggested, they tended to be members ideologically committed to the existing policy of preferences. There had not been a broad or deep discussion of the new policies throughout the faculty (for reasons I will return to in a moment), and thus no way of distinguishing between the policies themselves and the procedures that led to their enactment. But this is an old and familiar story. Twenty-five years ago Professor John Searle, reflecting on the campus wars of the '60s, commented on the behavior of the Academic Senate and its meetings in what I believe is the most penetrating analysis of those events. His remarks may help us understand the present disturbances, and faculty reactions to them: "The striking thing [about faculty meetings around contentious issues] is the extent to which a small group of really determined left-wing faculty who know exactly what they want and are prepared to seize the rhetorical initiative and fight for what they want, can exert an influence wildly disproportionate either to their own numbers or the size of their constituency in the faculty. The moderates not only tend to be unclear and indecisive about what they want, but they are also anxious to avoid a fight. They don't like being in adversary relationships, and they would like to keep peace in the faculty family as long as they can. At these meetings everyone is anxious to avoid a "divided faculty." (John Searle, The Campus War, New York, The World Publishing Company, 1971, pp. 147-148.) Or, as W.B. Yeats said in another time and place, "The best lack all conviction, while the worst are full of passionate intensity." (From "The Second Coming.") In the present instance, opponents of the new policy could not find anything like a consensus behind a condemnation of the substance of the Regents' new statement on affirmative action, for reasons suggested by the survey: there simply was and is no consensus, or even a clear majority, against the policy in the faculty. But in response to the cries of outrage against the Regents' action from activist faculty and students (and some administrators), the Senate members who were not themselves opposed to the principle of affirmative action without group preferences could find consensus where it is always easiest to find it: in condemnation of the procedures leading to the decisions. There is always a favorable response in the faculty to the cry of "inadequate consultation," both because consultation is the Senate's chief avenue of influence on decisions in the University, and also because it is often a well-founded complaint; consultation with administrative officers is often inadequate. Administrators often want or think they need to do something quickly, while the Senate's process of consultation through committees is notoriously slow. And administrators commonly shorten or even bypass consultation on the familiar ground that "there isn't enough time; a decision has to be made by next Tuesday." So some of these controversies over consultation are inherent in the relations between an administrative bureaucracy and the guild of academics organized in the Academic Senate, a guild of equals in which no one can give orders, but only try to persuade. But complaints about "inadequate consultation" are not always so well-founded. It is not uncommon in a system run largely through consultation, discussion and compromise for some who do not gain their ends through consultation to complain that therefore the consultation was inadequate — confusing consultation with agreement. "You haven't done what we urged you to do," they say, " therefore you didn't really listen to us, or consult properly with us, or take our views into account." I think some of this confusion of consultation with agreement is present in the current controversy. (Indeed I believe President Peltason warned about this in his farewell address). This leads me to a more general observation about the Academic Senate, its strength and limitations. In my view the Academic Senate is an enormously valuable institution for the protection and application of broadly held academic and scholarly values to the life of the university. There is behind everything we do in the University a broadly shared commitment to excellence in both teaching and research. There are indeed often arguments among academics about how best to pursue or achieve excellence, but as always when there is a solid underlying base of shared values, lengthy discussion and compromise almost always leads to some action which is broadly accepted by the faculty as legitimate, even when you don't quite agree with the outcome. On issues of curriculum, on the criteria for academic advancement, on the quality and effectiveness of this program or that research institute, for example, we can always reach some agreement because we all agree that our common aim is to be "the best." And we accept that the lengthy procedures of discussion and consultation within the Senate and its committees are the best way to get both good decisions and legitimate ones. But the Senate is not so good or effective in relation to issues on which there is no underlying consensus, on issues involving conflicts of values that have their sources outside of academic life. The Senate has something of the character of a secular Quaker meeting; it is constantly searching for consensus through reasoned discussion and compromise. It is best at trying to improve the quality of a program or the implementation of a policy that is broadly accepted, and it is quite prepared to wait for a sense of the meeting to emerge. That may drive administrators crazy, but it also ensures the legitimacy of the resulting decisions or recommendations within the academic community. On those issues the Senate and its Council is the voice of the faculty. And that points to its legitimate role in the present controversy, one that I believe it has already taken on - that is, the refinement and implementation of the new policy. Responsibility of the President's Office and the Chancellors But there is a further complication in the current dispute over consultation. The fact is that the Senate ordinarily advises the President and his officers (or at the Campus level, the Chancellors and his or her staff.) In the present case the issue centers around the consultation between the Senate and the Regents, in relation to a forthcoming change in Regential policy. But in fact there are no regular lines of communication between the Regents and the Senate, apart from the presence of the Chair and Vice Chair of the Council at meetings of the Regents as representatives of the faculty as a whole. There is in addition formal provision for the presentations of petitions by the faculty directly to the Regents, a rare event indeed. But the unwritten constitution of the University, which is central to its governance, is (or was) clear that the faculty ordinarily communicate with the Regents chiefly through the Academic Council and then through the President; to go around the President directly to a Regent is what is called pejoratively an "end run," which tends to undermine the authority of the President, is (or was) properly resented by him, and undermines his relationship with the Council and its Chair. Of course this does not preclude ordinary social relationships or friendships between faculty members and regents, but it does mean that there is no provision in the way we are organized for conducting formal consultations and negotiations directly between Regents and the Academic Senate apart from the representatives of the Senate who sit with you here. To the extent that these rules and norms have been weakened in the present dispute, to that extent the authority of the President has been weakened. Now the issue is raised whether the consultation with the Faculty in relation to the Regents' actions last July was adequate. It is my understanding that Regent Connerly did discuss his plans (though not the exact wording of his resolutions) with the then Chair and Vice chair of the Senate in the months before the July meeting. But those discussions, if I am correct, did not involve the President, who had already declared his firm opposition to the proposed changes in policy, and perhaps was unwilling to do anything that might increase its chances of passage. So there were not the extended discussions with faculty representatives that might fulfill our expectations about the right kind and degree of consultation on such an important issue, so close to central academic interests and values There are real costs to a deep and public split between the President of the University and the Regents, and this was one of them: the blocking of the chief channel of communications between faculty and Regents. Another was the mobilization of the President's Office behind the effort to defeat the new proposals, and the loss of that able staff as a resource for exploring alternatives, or of creative ways to implement the policy. And a third consequence of the commitment of the President to the defeat of the resolutions was, I suspect, a loss of confidence by the Regents, or at least by some Regents, in that office and in its work on this issue. These all weakened consultation, another word for cooperative working relationships among the several elements of university governance. Those relationships are all based on trust, and the loss or weakening of that trust may be the largest price of all. The public commitment of the President's Office on this issue was very unwise. Equally unwise, and part of the same campaign, was the vote of the Council of Chancellors to oppose the Regents' initiative. I believe it was reckless and irresponsible of them to challenge the Regents' authority to bring the University into line with public sentiment and the developing direction of public law on the issue. I think it was dangerous to establish a University orthodoxy on an issue on which at least half the faculty hold opposing views. I think it was foolish to undermine the institution from which their own authority derives. As men and women who hold and exercise authority, they should know how easily it is lost, and how difficult it is to regain. I can well understand how all this developed. In the months before the July vote, with public opposition to the proposed changes by the President, all the Chancellors, and the Academic Council, it might have seemed that the proposals could and would be defeated by the Regents as a whole. We are all paying the price of that grave miscalculation. Responsibility of the Council But there were difficulties in the way of full consultation on this issue which were neither of the Regents' making nor the President's. The Academic Council on its own initiative could have begun a broad discussion of the issue well before the Regents acted, one which tried to explore all sides of the issue, brought into the discussion the varied opinions within the Senate, and explored various alternatives that might be consistent with the Regents' broad aims. This is exactly what the Senate does best; such discussions within the Council and on the campuses both improve the quality of decisions and help make them acceptable throughout the University. This kind of discussion is ordinarily carried on through the standing committees of the Senate, the most important of which are represented on the Council, and through those committees is carried back into the Senate structures on the campuses. But for reasons which I can understand if not share, the then Chair of the Council chose to place the issue solely in the hands of the State-wide Committee on Affirmative Action, and not also in the hands of the Senate's Board of Admissions and Relations with Schools (BOARS) and the University Committee on Academic Personnel. This Committee on Affirmative Action which performs the useful function of bringing the interests and concerns of women and minority members in the University to the attention of the Council, is also the only Senate committee which is understood to represent a special interest, and to be an advocate for those interests; all other Senate committees are expected to address problems not from the point of view of a special interest but from the perspective of the University as whole. Referring the issue of the Regents' proposed changes of policy on affirmative action to the Committee on Affirmative Action alone was to guarantee the outcome, which was, predictably, a quick strong verbal recommendation to the Council to reaffirm the existing arrangements and reject the proposed changes in policy. And with that recommendation from that committee before them, the Council and the rest of the Senate could not see their way clear to rejecting it; it became the position of the Academic Senate, as thereafter embodied in resolutions from the Council and from the Campus Senates. But the report of the Committee on Affirmative Action did not initiate the broad discussion and debate within the Senate that could lead to constructive discussion with the Regents. Nor, may I say, did such discussions emerge from the President's Office, whose reports were still aimed at preventing the change in policy rather than refining or implementing it. Indeed, a fundamental obstacle to beginning the kind of consultation the Senate is good at lay in the belief both in the President's Office and in the Council that the resolutions could and should be defeated, rather than refined and creatively implemented. Responsibility of the Regents I have spoken somewhat critically of the role of the President's Office and the Academic Senate in the events leading up to the Regents meeting of last July. But we surely cannot understand our current problems without recognizing the circumstances in which the Regents' proposals were presented. They were broadly seen, not least in the University, as an element in the Governor's campaign for the Presidency. And that fact has tended to override discussion of the intrinsic merits or demerits of the policy itself. The academic community is not wholly naive about the role of politics in university life, but the timing of this was particularly troubling, subordinating as it did the merits of the issue to its political value. And coupled with the broad hostility of the University leadership, and the thinness of consultation with the academic community that I have already discussed, it does not surprise me that opposition to the policy among the faculty should be wider than the opposition to its principles and merits. Nor does it surprise me that opposition to the policy should take the form of attacks on the "procedures," and on the near absence of consultation with and within the Senate. I have already indicated that the weakness or absence of such consultation was not wholly the responsibility of the Regents; nevertheless, the circumstances under which the new proposals were presented and adopted certainly gave substance to the attacks on it, and deprived it of the legitimacy that University policy should have if it is to be broadly accepted and implemented. I believe many faculty members of good will who would accept or welcome the change in policy were troubled by the circumstances of its passage. It may well be that given the strength of the "affirmative action" community in the University, and of the strongly held values among many of its leaders, broad consultation with the Senate might have led to even stronger opposition to the policy; that may be what the proponents of the new policy on the Regents anticipated and feared. A good deal would have depended on how the issue was framed for the Senate, and that in turn would depend on behavior of the President and his relationship with the Regents, and particularly with the proponents of the new policy on the Regents. But it didn't happen that way, and there is enough blame for that to go around. Conclusion and Recommendations If my own views are not already apparent, let me make them clear. I think the new policy is a good policy, but gravely compromised in the timing and nature of its passage. I am not disturbed that this should have been an initiative of the Regents; on the contrary, the Regents have the responsibility to determine the fundamental nature of the University and its broad relationship to the society which supports it. This is a fundamental issue of public policy; retaining the old preferences would have been a Regential action as much as was abolishing them. No one else could have taken this action, not the President of the University (any President), nor the Chancellors and certainly not the Academic Senate. The only alternative would have been through a statewide initiative to be placed on the ballot. That was a real alternative, and many believe it would have been preferable to what happened. At least it probably would have saved the University from many of the troubles it has inherited. But that begs the question of whether the University should confront more directly some of the central moral issues of the day. Should we be out in front on such issues? I myself would have preferred a delay till after the election, but I am one of those seekers after peace and conciliation that I spoke of earlier. But I accept there is something to be said on both sides of that question, though we cannot turn time back to change the decision that was made. This is not the place or time to explain adequately why I think the old arrangements were bad: the unjust and unwarranted stigma of "affirmative action" carried by women and some because of their race or ethnicity; the transparent injustice of preferences granted to students from highly advantaged backgrounds arising out of old racial and ethnic stereotypes; the problems posed for the administration of affirmative action by the growing numbers of Americans of multiracial origins; the University's inability (and understandable reluctance) to detect plain fraud in claims of preferential group memberships -- for all these and other reasons the policy was not only unfair, but also occasioning more resentment among all groups, becoming a significant factor in dividing the academic community rather than bringing us together. I have raised these issues, most of them of recent history, not to rehash old arguments but to try to contribute to our understanding (and my own in the first case) of what brought us here, and how aspects of University governance failed in the face of this issue. It is not a happy story, nor is it a search for a cheap symmetry to say that all parts of the system were involved in the failure. But if the errors and failures of the past are confronted, they may also help in seeing where the University should go from here. On the governance side, I am clearer than ever that the welfare of the University depends on the relationship of the Regents with the President; they must be on the same page, and support each other, at least publicly. On the substantive side, I believe that the University must move on to the question of how best to implement an affirmative action policy that does not provide categorical preferences, but serves the whole community, ensures access to all without regard to their race, ethnicity or sex, and continues to reflect the diversity of the population of the state. But if that is to be more than empty rhetoric, it means taking seriously the role of the University in improving the quality of primary and secondary schooling in the state, especially in those places and schools where it is weakest, and least productive of University entrants. The University has had a deep relationship with almost every major institution in the society: from our earliest days with agriculture, increasingly with industry, with the Federal government through the Energy Labs and in many other ways, with state and local governments and all the professions. We need to be as deeply involved with the schools. I am proud that Berkeley has pioneered this new commitment with the Berkeley Pledge, and I look with hope to the President's new Plan to Enhance Educational Participation (PREP). I strongly suspect that these important new initiatives would not have been taken if the Regents had not changed University policy last July. The old preference system was the cheap, quick and easy way to get diversity; improving education and the schools is a harder but an infinitely better way. Those programs, and others like them on every campus, must be our commitments for the long run. In the short run we must find ways to recognize and admit students who have overcome handicaps and adversity and shown qualities of character that may not yet be reflected in their grades or test scores. I also warmly support the suggestion made by some wise members of the University that the Regents appoint a special committee bringing some of their own number, administrative officers and leaders of the Academic Senate together to shape policies and programs in these directions -- and also to provide a line of communications among them. But none of this will work if we are still debating the recision of this policy. That would keep alive the adversarial and divisive elements of a University at war with itself, and that struggle might indeed become a permanent part of the way the University is governed. That would change not just governance but the University utterly. As you know, that is frankly and explicitly desired by some inside and outside the University. For those, the real target is not a particular policy but the authority of the Board of Regents, and its very nature. I think their numbers are small, though their voices are loud. In my view their success would be the greatest disaster for the University which I love and to which I have given a good part of my life. I count on you not to let that happen, and to find not one but many ways to bring us together again, on this as on the other issues that may divide us. Martin Trow Professor Graduate School of Public Policy U.C. Berkeley CA. 94720, USA e mail: Trow@violet.Berkeley.edu fax: 510 643 9657